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Introduction
Interest in diversifi cation has largely focused 
on three topics: the way in which business 
diversifi cation can be measured [19], [35], 
[48], [60], [69], the relationship between 
diversifi cation and business results and the 
factors that determine diversifi cation [4], [6], 
[11], [12], [17], [26], [27], [36], [41], [50], [58], 
[70], [71], [74], [72]. However, less attention has 
been paid to the impact of ownership structure 
(concentration and main shareholder) on degree 
of business diversifi cation [13], [14], [16], [19], 
[30], [31], [63], [76]. Although some authors 
mention, in theoretical terms, the importance of 
concentration of ownership [2], [15], [30], [44] 
and the type of shareholder/s that effectively 
control the fi rm [19], [54] [55], [71], [75], in an 
analysis of business diversifi cation, very few 
studies have analyzed empirically said impact, 
with exceptions focusing on the US, European 
and Asian corporations [3], [11], [15], [19], 
[25], [27], [29], [40], [58], [50], [74]. The results 
found in the literature regarding corporate 
diversifi cation strategy are not conclusive, due 
to differences in the concept of diversifi cation 
and measurements used for its study [5], [49].
This study shares the objective of learning 
more about corporate diversifi cation strategies 
in relation to type of controlling shareholder 
or group, more specifi cally we study impact 
of ownership structure on degree and type 
of business diversifi cation. The study differs 
in several ways, however, from previous 
research. First, we use data that is largely taken 
from the information supplied by fi rms to the 
Spanish Stock Market Commission (Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores). This should 
guarantee its reliability. Secondly, unlike most 
of the previous studies, in which the fi rm itself 
is the unit of analysis, our diversifi cation study 
uses the pyramidal group of independent fi rms 
controlled by the same parent company; as most 
of the determinant factors of diversifi cation are 
similar to the factors that explain the existence 
of pyramidal groups of fi rms, we believe that 
it is more pertinent to study type and degree 
of business diversifi cation in relation to the 
entire group rather than the parent company 
(Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantarak and Schoar 
[7], Bru and Crespi [9], and Hernández and 
Galve [33]). Thirdly, we present comparisons 
of the growth strategies (diversifi cation versus 
specialisation) adopted by business groups 
controlled by a family, by foreign capital, by 
a bank or several shareholders, none of which 
have effective control of the fi rm.
The paper is organized as follows: 
section 1 refers to the theoretical development 
of diversifi cation covering the analysis 
of diversifi cation from a pyramidal group 
perspective and the infl uence of ownership 
structure. Section 2 deals with research 
method, including the sample, the variables 
measurement and the methodology. Finally, 
section 3 presents the results and conclusions.
1. Theoretical Development 
of Diversifi cation: Group 
Pyramidal and Ownership 
Structure
1.1 Analysis of Diversifi cation from 
a Pyramidal Group Perspective
Diversifi cation implies a fi rm moving into 
a number of markets (sectors, industries or 
segment) it was not previously engaged in. For 
several decades, product diversifi cation has 
been a highly popular strategy among large 
and growing industrial fi rms in the industrialized 
world. Firm uses three main strategies to 
diversify across product segment like vertical 
integration, related diversifi cation and unrelated 
diversifi cation.
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Most of the studies on diversifi cation have 
been focused on aspects such as the “extent” of 
diversifi cation (i.e. less or more diversifi cation), 
the “directions” (i.e. related or unrelated), and 
the “mode” (i.e. diversifi cation via internal 
expansion or diversifi cation via mergers 
and acquisitions of fi rms). Some empirical 
studies obtain that diversifying into related 
product-markets produces higher returns than 
diversifying into unrelated product-markets and 
less diversifi ed fi rms performs better than highly 
diversifi ed fi rms [64].
During the 60s and 70s, many companies 
used acquisitions of companies such as 
instrument for industrial diversifi cation. The risk-
averse fi rms minimized their risk by acquiring 
companies in other sectors, increasing their profi ts 
through greater economies of scale and scope. 
The success of diversifi cation, using acquisitions 
as a means to diversify, is linked to a variety of 
factors such as company resources, legal and 
regulatory restrictions, and the macroeconomic 
environment. Moreover, the failure may be due 
to factors as diverse as the reason for purchase 
was not the acquisition of synergies but pursue 
personal interests of managers.
A review of the literature about factors 
explaining corporate diversifi cation shows 
that most studies take the fi rm itself as their 
unit of analysis. As far as we know, there 
are very few studies that analyze pyramidal 
corporations. However, the development of 
international communications and information 
technologies in the last few years, together 
with the deregulation of economic and fi nancial 
trade, has accelerated market and business 
globalisation, giving rise to a gap between fi rm 
size and the much larger size of the market. 
This need for a larger dimension in order to 
compete on increasingly globalised markets 
and the inability of fi rms to develop all the 
resources and capabilities required for success 
without help, leads fi rms to establish different 
arrangements with other fi rms in order to attain 
these targets. In such a changing situation, fi rms 
have become involved in complex processes of 
structural and organizational reforms, and there 
has been a heavy increase in pyramidal groups 
as organizations capable of fi nding balance 
between the fl exibility provided by the market 
and the coordination and stability derives from 
activity insourcing.
Pyramidal groups are defi ned as 
organization in which legally independent 
enterprises are controlled by the same 
entrepreneur (the parent company) through an 
ownership chain. This study, in order to avoid 
a biased view of business decisions related to 
diversifi cation strategy, the unit used for our 
analysis of diversifi cation is a pyramidal group 
of companies. The reason is that most of the 
factors that determine diversifi cation are similar 
to the factors that explain the existence of 
pyramidal groups of companies, so we believe 
that it is more pertinent to study type and degree 
of business diversifi cation in relation to business 
groups rather than their parent companies.
The reasons for the formation of business 
groups can be divided into a) group members 
can satisfy their fi nancing needs by making use 
of internal funds available in the group, b) group 
members can also overcome the ineffi ciencies 
of factor or supplementary service markets 
when the group is of companies each of which 
is involved in at least one of the activities in the 
value chain, and c) the group also enables its 
members to make use of the know-how and 
capability of other members, to access new 
technologies and to reduce risks. Furthermore, 
groups can also be created for much more 
obscure reasons related to obtaining private 
profi ts (through tunnelling strategies), tax 
evasion and the exercise of market power [57].
1.2 Ownership Concentration, Family 
Control and Diversifi cation: Theory 
and Research Hypotheses
There is not much literature analysing 
the relationship between concentration of 
ownership and familial nature of last owner and 
type of diversifi cation [29], [41], [54] and it is 
more common to fi nd studied that investigate 
the impact of different types of diversifi cation on 
performance. There are different alternatives 
[64], [65] and the most common are related and 
unrelated. Diversifi cation in related businesses 
makes better use of economies of scale and 
scope, increasing the value created by the fi rm 
[66] and enabling said businesses to benefi t 
from the fi rm’s core activity and customer base 
[59]; related diversifi cation makes better use of 
the business’s core resources and skills [8] is 
less complex and incurs less costs. Unrelated 
diversifi cation, however, increases the fi rm’s 
market power [56], reducing income variability 
and the likelihood of bankruptcy [42] and 
benefi ting from an internal capital market [66].
Many researchers have attempted to 
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understand the applicability of several theories 
to approximate and explain fi rm’s diversifi cation 
behavior. The most commonly used approaches 
or theories in the study of diversifi cation include:
a) Transaction Cost Theory and Industrial 
Economy Theory, which sustain that 
diversifi cation is for external and 
market reasons (search for new market 
opportunities, reduce transaction costs 
when they exceed the cost of insourcing 
certain activities, search for market power). 
According to Transaction Cost Theory fi rms 
diversify their activities in response to the 
existence of unutilized resources and 
nature of these resources.
b) Resource and Capability Theory, 
according to which diversifi cation is due 
to internal reasons (manager’s ability to 
exploit commotions and discover new 
opportunities, availability of indivisible 
internal resources and public resources that 
can be used to obtain different products or 
provide services with the same effi cacy).
In this paper we mainly use the 
Agency Theory approach, according to 
which diversifi cation can be for effi ciency, 
management or tunnelling reasons, depending 
on degree of concentration of ownership and 
type of controlling shareholder. Although there 
is evidence of the importance of ownership 
structure and family ownership in degree of 
diversifi cation [3], [15], [16], [30], [31], [63], 
[71], results are by no means conclusive. 
Literature refers to both positive and negative 
effects of concentration of ownership and family 
ownership on degree and type of diversifi cation.
The perspective of agency theory says 
that the greater concentration of ownership, 
the greater the risk assumed by said owners 
and the greater their interest in reducing 
said risk by diversifi cation strategy [22], [73]. 
Other authors, however, believe that greater 
diversifi cation with greater concentration of 
ownership is not to reduce risk but because 
the majority shareholders (who are in turn the 
fi rm’s managers) are seeking greater profi ts 
and benefi ts even if it is at the expense of the 
wealth of minority shareholders (this is known as 
tunnelling, which is defi nes as the transfer of fi rm 
assets and profi ts to controlling owners) (agency 
problem type II) [15], [39], [43], [47], [74].
On the other hand, with regards to type of 
shareholder or controlling group, Shleifer and 
Vishny [69], Fama and Jensen [23] and Faccio, 
Lang and Young [21] say that family fi rms 
have considerable incentives for minimising 
risk given the non-diverse nature of family 
investment. Corporate diversifi cation is an 
attractive strategic option for family fi rms, as it 
enables them to mitigate risk, reducing income 
and result variability [20], [21], [71].
However, the studies conducted by Jensen 
[37], Jensen & Murphy [38] and Hoskisson and 
Hitt [34] show that diversifi cation is undertaken 
for managerial reasons (agency problem 
type I); the managers of fi rms with no controlling 
shareholders have economic and personal 
incentives to apply diversifi cation strategies, 
even if it is detrimental for shareholders. 
Shleifer and Vishny [67] say that concentration 
of ownership is the most direct way in which to 
align the residual rights and control of external 
investors, limiting managerial discretionality and 
eliminating tunnelling-induced ineffi ciencies 
[68]. On the other hand, when a fi rm’s 
managers are also shareholders, the more 
shares they own, the more their interests are 
in line with those of other shareholders, so 
there will be less diversifi cation in the fi rm [6], 
[12], [17], [30]. In the specifi c case of family 
fi rms, the interests of family shareholders who 
are also managers will be in line with those of 
minority shareholders, so less diversifi cation 
is to be expected [4], [19], [30], [51], [55], [71]. 
Friedland, Palmer and Stenbeck [24] show that 
family fi rms have less incentive to diversify for 
social and fi nancial reasons. Diversifi cation can 
endanger close personal relationships among 
family members, which could affect a fi rm’s 
survival, which is one of its primary objectives: 
“to guarantee the fi rm’s survival and long-term 
family control”. Gómez-Mejía et al. [29] sustain 
that diversifi cation involves a reduction in 
familial socio-emotional wealth (the negative 
effect of diversifi cation on socio-emotional 
wealth is greater than its positive effect on 
reducing the concentration of risk, so family 
fi rms diversify less than non-family enterprises). 
On the other hand, diversifi cation requires 
fi nancial resources, which would weaken family 
control and increase fi nancial risk if the fi rm 
decides to borrow [18].
With regards to deciding on one type of 
diversifi cation, since the pioneer study by 
Rumelt [65], the literature generally refers to 
superior performance and productivity with 
related over unrelated diversifi cation, with the 
former having a positive impact on performance 
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[46], [61], while the later has a negative impact 
on results and productivity [6], [10]; Unrelated 
diversifi cation is used by managers to satisfy 
personal interests and obtain higher income 
and greater prestige [68] to the detriment of 
maximisation of shareholder utility and the 
fi rm’s value [17]. Some studies, however, 
consider that there are no differences between 
the two types of diversifi cation [32], [41].
With regards to the impact of ownership 
structure on decisions concerning type of 
diversifi cation, we have seen that the greater 
the concentration of ownership, the less 
discretionality that managers have [68], 
reducing investments in unrelated businesses 
in an attempt to reduce managers’ personal 
risk [1] and the lower the agency costs involved 
[17], preferring related diversifi cation strategies 
that have a positive impact on business 
performance and are more likely to create 
value [9]. On the other hand, depending on 
the type of controlling shareholder, family fi rms 
with signifi cant concentration of ownership may 
prefer unrelated diversifi cation, as it reduces the 
risks supported by the family [45] by reducing 
income and result volatility [21]. This strategy, 
however, requires the use of new resources and 
skills that makes it more diffi cult and complex 
[20]. Moreover, family fi rms attempt to maintain 
control over the business and to ensure its 
survival [54], so they tend to invest in activities 
associated to lower costs and less uncertainty, 
preferring related diversifi cation strategies that 
preserve their socio-emotional wealth [28].
We also considered the possibility of fi rms 
preferring a mixed strategy, simultaneously 
combined related and unrelated diversifi cation. 
Mixed diversifi cation requires more resources 
and is more complicated from an organizational 
perspective, increasing agency and information 
costs [73], which have a negative impact 
on performance. In fi rms with non-family 
managers, they are expected to prefer mixed 
diversifi cation, as this option enables them to 
spread out their personal risk and increase their 
power [1].
Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
contemplated:
H1: Concentration of ownership favours 
a preference for a specialisation strategy rather 
than a diversifi cation strategy.
H2: Family-controlled fi rms show a greater 
preference for specialisation than non-family 
fi rms.
H3: Family fi rms show a greater preference 
for diversifi cation the greater the concentration 
of family ownership.
H4: Concentration of ownership favours 
a preference for related diversifi cation rather 
than mixed or unrelated strategies.
H5a: Family-controlled fi rms show a greater 
preference for related diversifi cation than non-
family enterprises.
H5b: Family-controlled fi rms show a lower 
preference for mixed diversifi cation than no-
family enterprises.
H6: Family fi rms show a greater preference 
for unrelated diversifi cation the greater the 
concentration of family ownership.
2. Research Method
2.1 Sample
The study starts with an initial sample of fi rms 
that traded on the Spanish stock markets in 
2000–2005, operating in different sectors (the 
fi nancial and energy sectors not are including 
because they have special regulations). 
Selection period is justifi ed in the fi rst place 
to avoid no comparative data since in 2007 
a new law on takeover bids of companies 
takes effect [77]. The most important aspects 
introduced by the new law are the disappearing 
public offerings of mandatory partial acquisition 
(although there may be a voluntary basis) and 
will launch a mandatory tender offer for 100 
percent of the capital of a company when it 
acquires at least 30 percent of voting rights or 
when participation increased by at least fi ve 
per cent in less than 12 months. Furthermore, 
2006 is not considered to be an atypical year, 
characterized as the period of greatest growth 
in sale and purchase of businesses (The 
number of mergers and acquisitions increased 
by 45 percent between 2005 and 2006 and the 
volume increases by nearly 70 percent) [77].
After eliminating fi rms for which all the 
information required for the study is not 
available, the fi nal sample comprises 99 fi rms 
(594 observations). Specialisation and different 
types of diversifi cation are determined from the 
annual reports supplied by the Stock Market 
Commission and the SABI-Informa database, 
which provides precise information about 
non-listed fi rms controlled by a listed parent 
company. Finally, the ownership information 
required to defi ne a fi rm as a family fi rm or 
not, and to identify the last owner in non-family 
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organizations, was obtained from the Stock 
Market Commission website and the SABI-
Informa database, occasionally resorting to 
secondary sources such as the media and the 
websites of the fi rms in the sample.
2.2 Variables Measurement
To measure degree of diversifi cation, most studies 
only consider fi rm activities [3], [29], [41]. This 
study, however, considers the activities performed 
by the listed fi rm and those performed by the 
group of companies that it heads. This provides 
a more objective view of degree of diversifi cation, 
as other studies ignore the activities of the fi rms 
that form part of the parent company’s global 
strategy. Another reason for this analysis is 
the large number of family business groups in 
Spain. The study will thus obtain greater degrees 
of diversifi cation than would be found if it only 
considered the parent company [11].
Following the Spanish General Accounting 
Plan, group companies are defi ned as fi rms 
over which the parent (listed) company has or 
could have direct or indirect effective control. 
According to the Spanish General Accounting 
Plan, control is defi ned as “when a (dominant) 
company is related to another (dependent) in 
any of the following ways:
(a) it holds a majority of voting rights;
(b) it is able to appoint or dismiss most of 
the members of the administrative body”.
After analyzing the companies in each 
group, we analysed their annual accounts, 
using the SABI-Informa database when group 
companies are not listed. This information 
enables us to identify the activities of each 
fi rm, using the CNAE 93 Rev. 1 classifi cation 
(Spanish Economic Activity Classifi cation code 
that identifi es and classifi es company according 
to their economic activity; It is an adaptation of 
the European NACE and similar to the Standard 
Industrial Classifi cation, SIC).
The study shows the possibility of combining 
different diversifi cation strategies, considering 
three alternatives: specialisation, a single type 
of diversifi cation (related or unrelated) and 
mixed strategies, which involve both related 
and unrelated diversifi cation. Following are the 
diversifi cation variables used in the study:
1. Specialisation (SPECIALISATION): 
dummy variable; value is one when the listed 
fi rm and its group companies perform the 
same/a single activity and zero otherwise (the 
company has diverse activities).
2. Pure related diversifi cation (PURE REL. 
DIV.): dummy variable; value is one when the 
number of related activities performed by the 
listed fi rm and/or its business group is two or 
more and zero otherwise. Related activities are 
defi ned as activities with the same two digits 
in the CNAE 93 Rev. 1 classifi cation, in which 
the last two are different; they are activities that 
require similar resources and capabilities.
3. Pure unrelated diversifi cation (PURE 
UNREL. DIV.): dummy variable; the value is 
one when the number of unrelated activities 
performed by the listed fi rm and/or its business 
group is two or more and zero otherwise. 
Unrelated activities are defi ned as activities in 
which the fi rst two digits are different, which 
do not require similar resources and capabilities 
and are not common activities that form part of 
the listed company’s value chain.
4. Mixed diversifi cation (MIXED DIV.): 
dummy variable; the value is one when the 
fi rm combines related (PURE REL. DIV.) and 
unrelated (PURE UNREL. DIV.) diversifi cation 
strategies.
With regards to ownership variables, there 
are a signifi cant number of different defi nitions 
used to defi ne a family fi rm [52]. In this study, 
a company is a family fi rm (FAMILY) when the 
family owns (directly or indirectly) the largest 
share package and one or several family 
members are in key managerial positions and 
on the board of directors. Furthermore, to 
confi rm a correct classifi cation, we identifi ed 
their last owners, analysing horizontal and 
vertical ownership chains to obtain the same 
results [43]. On the other hand, a fi rm’s 
characterisation as a non-family enterprise 
also depends on the last owner’s identity, 
distinguishing between three control groups:
a) Firms controlled by foreign capital 
(FOREIGN); the last owners are individuals or 
corporations that are non-residents in Spain.
b) Firms under fi nancial control 
(FINANCIAL); the last owners are banks or 
investment funds.
c) Non effective control (NEC); an 
organization in which there is no single owner 
with effective control, as the shareholders own 
similar blocks of shares. A fi rm characterized as 
with non effective control (NEC) includes both 
a fi rm with multiple anonymous shareholders, 
none of whom hold a signifi cant share, and 
a fi rm with a small number of shareholders with 
similar signifi cant holdings.
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Degree of concentration of ownership is 
measured by the percentage of shares owned 
by the fi ve largest shareholders (OWNERSHIP).
In line with previous research on the topic 
[3], [11], [29] we included the following control 
variables for the diversifi cation study. We fi rst 
considered fi rm size, measures by the logarithm 
of the total assets of the listed company 
(SIZE). Secondly, the age of the fi rm was 
established as the logarithm of the difference 
between two thousand and the year when 
the listed fi rm was established (AGE). Thirdly, 
the leverage of the listed fi rm was measured 
as the ratio between its total debts and total 
assets (LEVERAGE). Fourthly, investment in 
research and development was measures as 
the ratio between total intangible assets and 
total assets (R&D). A dummy variable was 
also included, with a value of 1 when there had 
been a structural change in the listed fi rm, and 
0 otherwise (SCD); this variable enabled us to 
control listed fi rms that had been involved in 
mergers and/or buyouts in 2000–2005, which 
could represent an important change in their 
degree or type of diversifi cation.
2.3 Methodology
We fi rst performed a descriptive study of the 
sample fi rms and the correlations between the 
different variables. Secondly, we examined the 
distribution of the fi rms in the sample according 
to diversifi cation strategy, distinguishing 
between different types of fi rms attending to 
the nature of the shareholder of control. Finally, 
several binary logistic regression models were 
formulated for each of the dependent variables, 
to verify the validity of the models [62]. The 
SPSS 15.0 computer package was used 
throughout.
3. Results and Discussion
Table 1 shows the mean values, standard 
deviations and bilateral correlations between 
the variables used in the study. The data 
show that 24% of business groups prefer 
specialization, 20% prefer pure diversifi cation 
strategies (18% diversify in unrelated and 2% in 
related businesses) and more than half (56%) 
prefer mixed diversifi cation. These fi ndings are 
consistent given that listed companies that are 
studied, which are characterized by a larger 
size and the employment of pyramidal groups 
to diversifi cation. The bilateral correlations 
between the primary variables show that 
concentration of ownership is positively 
associated to specialization and pure related 
diversifi cation and negatively associated to 
mixed diversifi cation and fi rm size. Family 
control is positively correlated to concentration 
of ownership, specialization and pure related 
diversifi cation and negatively correlated to 
mixed diversifi cation. Firms with fi nancial 
control or no effective control are negatively 
related to specialization and positively related 
to mixed diversifi cation. There are, however, 
no signifi cant correlations in specialization/
diversifi cation preferences for fi rms controlled 
by foreign capital. Therefore, at fi rst is observed 
as the highest ownership concentration and 
family character promote specialization and 
related diversifi cation strategies, and decrease 
the likelihood of using mixed diversifi cation 
strategies.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the fi rms in 
the sample according to diversifi cation strategy, 
distinguishing between different types of fi rm 
with reference to type of controlling shareholder 
(last owner). The sample is dominated by 
family fi rms (58.08%), followed by fi rms 
without effective control (19.20%), fi nancial 
fi rms (15.92%) and, fi nally, fi rms controlled by 
foreign capital (6.90%). The results show that, 
irrespective of who controls the company, 24% 
of the fi rms prefer specialization, more than 
half prefer mixed diversifi cation (56.4%) and 
only 19.7% choose pure diversifi cation (17.8% 
unrelated and only 1.9% related diversifi cation). 
Secondly, in relation to the type of controlling 
shareholder, the data reveal differences, with 
family fi rms preferring specialization (32.5%) 
and pure related diversifi cation (2.9%) more 
than non-family enterprises, and showing 
less preference for mixed diversifi cation 
strategies (47.5%). Ten of the eleven fi rms 
that only use related diversifi cation are family 
businesses. Thirdly, in relation to non-family 
fi rms, we found that fi rms with no effective 
shareholder control present greater levels of 
pure unrelated diversifi cation (26.3%) and 
lower levels of specialization (7.9%). Firms 
controlled by foreign capital or banks use 
similar diversifi cation strategies.
Table 3 shows the results of the different 
binomial logistic models that explain the 
impact of concentration of ownership and 
type of controlling shareholder (last owner) 
on specialization and diversifi cation strategies 
(distinguishing between pure unrelated 
EM_4_2015.indd   83 1.12.2015   8:44:44
84 2015, XVIII, 4
Ekonomika a management
and mixed diversifi cation). There is no 
multicollinearity between the explanatory 
variables of any of the models [53].
When studying the impact of being a family 
fi rm on specialization/diversifi cation, we not 
only considered family versus non-family 
enterprises, but also identifi ed the last owner 
of the non-family organizations (distinguishing 
between fi rms controlled by foreign capital, 
under fi nancial control and with no effective 
control), performing a more precise analysis 
of the Logit model. We also considered 
the interaction between family control and 
concentration of ownership in order to assess 
possible differences in the behaviour of 
families due to differences in concentration of 
ownership. The results of the specialization 
strategy models (models 1, 3 and 4) reveal 
a positive impact of concentration of ownership 
on choice of this strategy, confi rming H1 
(results similar to those obtained by Amihud & 
Lev [1] and Goranova et al. [30]). Ownership 
concentration allows aligning the residual rights 
and controlling external investors, limiting 
managerial discretionality (agency problem 
type I) [67].
On the other hand, with regards to type 
of principal shareholder, models 2, 3 and 
4 show, fi rstly, that family-controlled fi rm 
use specialization (through their group of 
companies) more than non-family enterprises 
(controlled by foreign capital, by several 
shareholders none of whom control the fi rm 
alone and controlled by a bank), confi rming H2 
(results similar to those found by Anderson & 
Reeb [3]; Gómez-Mejía et al. [29]). The interest 
of family shareholders will be in line with those 
of minority shareholders, the agency problem 
type I (manager vs. shareholders) will be less 
important, and the employment of diversifi cation 
strategies will be decreased [4], [19], [55], [71].
Secondly, family fi rms with greater 
concentration of ownership specialize less than 
those with less concentration of ownership, 
confi rming H3 and showing different behaviour 
by family fi rms depending on concentration of 
ownership [3], [51]. This may be because the 
greater concentration of family ownership, 
the greater the risk assumed by family 
members, and diversifi cation strategy allows 
reducing said risk. Furthermore, greater 
ownership concentration facilitates the minority 
shareholders wealth expropriation by family 
(tunneling), appearing an agency problem type 
II [15], [39], [74]. Finally, with regards to fi rm size 
and involvement in mergers/acquisitions, they 
MEAN SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. OWNERSHIP 57.24 24.78 1.00
2. SIZE 11.95 1.58 -0.115** 1.000
3. AGE 3.63 0.71 0.015 0.030 1.000
4. LEVERAGE 0.37 0.22 0.059 0.463** 0.103* 1.000
5. R&D 0.03 0.08 -0.030 0.280** -0.003 0.185** 1.000
6. DSC 0.22 0.41 0.038 0.580** -0.034 0.203** 0.044 1.000
7. FAMILY 0.58 0.49 0.242** -0.324** -0.103* -0.030 -0.127** -0.145** 1.000
8. FOREIGN 0.07 0.25 0.098* 0.140** -0.004 -0.079 -0.030 0.014 -0.321** 1.000
9. FINANCIAL 0.16 0.36 -0.190** 0.190** -0.033 0.040 0.053 0.090* -0.510** -0.118** 1.000
10. NCE 0.19 0.39 -0.190** 0.140** 0.162** 0.052 0.130** 0.089* -0.574** -0.133** -0.211** 1.000
11. SPECIALISATION 0.24 0.42 0.234** -0.524** -0.008 -0.086* -0.245** -0.290** 0.236** -0.044 -0.092* -0.183** 1.000
12. PURE DIV. 0.20 0.04 -0.010 -0.182** -0.047 -0.176** 0.076 -0.173** 0.009 -0.035 -0.087* 0.092* -0.278** 1.000
13. PURE REL. DIV. 0.02 0.13 0.114** -0.062 -0.115** -0.025 -0.102* 0.017 0.091* -0.037 -0.060 -0.035 -0.077 0.277** 1.000
14. PURE UNREL. DIV. 0.18 0.38 -0.050 -0.167** -0.008 -0.174** 0.115** -0.186** -0.023 -0.023 -0.070 0.108** -0.261** 0.941** -0.064 1.000
15. MIXED DIV. 0.56 0.49 -0.194** 0.597** 0.045 0.216** 0.150** 0.388** -0.210** 0.065 0.149** 0.084* -0.637** -0.563** -0.156** -0.530** 1.000
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01
Source: own
Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables (rho de Spearman)
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TOTAL FAMILY FOREIGN FINANCIAL NCE
Chi-squared
N % N % N % N % N %
1. SPECIALISATION 142 23.9 112 32.5 7 17.1 14 14.9 9 7.9 35.205***
2. PURE DIV. 117 19.7 69 20.0 6 14.6 11 11.7 31 27.2 8.533**
2.1 PURE REL. DIV. 11 1.9 10 2.9 - --- - --- 1 0.9 5.223
2.2 PURE UNREL. DIV 106 17.8 59 17.1 6 14.6 11 11.7 30 26.3 8.147**
3. MIXED DIV. 335 56.40 164 47.5 28 68.3 69 73.4 74 64.9 27.793***
TOTAL 594 100 345 58.08 41 6.90 94 15.82 114 19.20
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01
Source: own
Tab. 2: Diversifi cation strategies according to fi rm’s ultimate owner
SPECIALISATION MIXED DIVERSIFICATION PURE UNRELATE DIVERSIFICATION
(1) β-coef
(wald)
(2) β-coef
(wald)
(3) β-coef
(wald)
(4) β-coef
(wald)
(5) β-coef
(wald)
(6) β-coef
(wald)
(7) β-coef
(wald)
(8) β-coef
(wald)
(9) β-coef
(wald)
(10) β-coef
(wald)
(11) β-coef
(wald)
(12) β-coef
(wald)
CONSTANT 10.386***(40.713)
10.575***
(36.732)
9.379***
(26.913)
8.924***
(23.712)
-11.421***
(64.513)
-12.331***
(66.298)
-11.443***
(55.269)
-11.513***
(54.681)
-0.826
(0.430)
-0.074
(0.003)
0.136
(0.010)
0.415
(0.086)
OWNER-
SHIP
2.505***
(18.767)
2.110***
(11.300)
3.946***
(12.848)
-1.790***
(14.711)
-1.937***
(13.885)
-3.365***
(21.543)
-0.499
(1.177)
-0.281
(0.311)
0.940
(1.853)
FAMILY 1.362***(10.026)
0.869**
(3.881)
2.346***
(7.801)
-0.142
(0.231)
0.155
(0.264)
-1.521**
(5.594)
-0.762***
(6.760)
-0.714**
(5.468)
0.645
(1.132)
FOREIGN 1.842***(8.802)
0.976
(2.194)
0.345
(0.232)
-0.249
(0.293)
0.406
(0.669)
0.788
(2.268)
-0.904*
(3.116)
-0.815
(2.319)
-1.143**
(4.154)
FINANCIAL 1.382**(6.435)
1.144**
(4.155)
0.983*
(2.755)
0.208
(0.295)
0.139
(0.126)
0.035
(0.008)
-1.032**
(6.421)
-1.036**
(6.433)
-1.017**
(6.269)
OWNER-
SHIP * 
FAMILY
-2.860**
(4.442)
3.020***
(8.815)
-2.646**
(6.604)
SIZE -1.350***(83.913)
-1.393***
(87.202)
-1.345***
(77.294)
-1.367***
(79.653)
1.095***
(84.530)
1.109***
(83.493)
1.084***
(76.555)
1.150***
(79.662)
0.010
(0.011)
0.017
(0.028)
0.005
(0.002)
-0.046
(0.192)
AGE 0.352(2.691)
0.486**
(4.926)
0.460**
(4.229)
0.419*
(3.389)
-0.036
(0.055)
-0.084
(0.281)
-0.019
(0.014)
0.017
(0.010)
0.079
(0.221)
-0.040
(0.055)
-0.031
(0.032)
-0.106
(0.354)
LEVERAGE 2.979***(16.933)
3.220***
(21.151)
2.978***
(16.715)
2.982***
(3.389)
-0.472
(0.695)
-0.773
(1.964)
-0.425
(0.547)
-0.663
(1.308)
-1.869***
(9.613)
-1.894***
(9.927)
-1.831***
(8.973)
-1.733***
(8.023)
SCD -2.300**(4.778)
-1.738*
(2.758)
-2.213**
(4.355)
-2.119**
(4.038)
1.241***
(8.960)
0.822**
(4.350)
1.322***
(9.508)
1.274***
(8.644)
-1.577***
(10.587)
-1.715***
(12.664)
-1.664***
(11.464)
-1.658***
(10.997)
R&D 2.433(2.003)
2.440
(2.290)
2.905
(2.618)
3.680*
(3.829)
-3.833**
(6.441)
-3.134**
(4.167)
-3.686**
(5.896)
-4.683***
(8.708)
1.672
(1.873)
1.234
(0.975)
1.181
(0.873)
1.967
(2.330)
N 594 594 594 594 594 594 594 594 594 594 594 594
Likelihood 
Ratio 394.537 400.762 389.082 384.485 527.385 541.134 526.693 517.549 511.250 503.227 502.916 496.239
Chi-square 248.755*** 242.531*** 254.210*** 258.807*** 273.800*** 260.052*** 274.493*** 283.636*** 41.998*** 50.021*** 50.331*** 57.009***
R2 Cox and 
Snell 0.347 0.340 0.353 0.358 0.374 0.359 0.375 0.385 0.069 0.082 0.083 0.093
R2 Nagel-
kerske 0.520 0.509 0.529 0.536 0.501 0.481 0.502 0.515 0.113 0.134 0.135 0.152
Corrected 
classifi ed 85.1% 83.9% 85.4% 85.1% 81.7% 80.8% 80.7% 80.8% 82.2% 81.8% 82.0% 82.2%
* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01
Source: own
Tab. 3: Binomial Logit: Specialisation, Mixed Diversifi cation and Pure Unrelated Diversifi cation
EM_4_2015.indd   85 1.12.2015   8:44:44
86 2015, XVIII, 4
Ekonomika a management
are negatively related to specialization (similar 
results to those obtained by Anderson & Reeb 
[3], Gómez-Mejía et al. [29] for size and by Miller 
et al. [55] for the merger/acquisition variable).
Table 3 also analyses the impact of 
concentration of ownership and family nature of 
business on diversifi cation, with fi rms preferring 
pure (only one type of related or unrelated 
diversifi cation) or mixed diversifi cation (fi rms 
diversify their activities in related or unrelated 
manners). None of the fi rms that use pure 
related diversifi cation are controlled by foreign 
agents or banks (Tab. 2), confi rming partially 
H5a (is not possible to make a binomial logistic 
model). The results of the complete mixed 
diversifi cation model (model 8) show a negative 
impact of concentration of ownership on the 
choice of this type of strategy, confi rming H4. 
The greater ownership concentration, the 
less discretionality that managers have [68], 
reducing agency problem type I (lower agency 
costs [16]), and decreasing investments in 
unrelated businesses, preferring related 
diversifi cation strategies that have a positive 
impact on business performance [9].
On the other hand, the data reveal that 
family fi rms prefers mixed diversifi cation less 
than non-family enterprises (confi rming H5b), 
because these strategies are associate to 
higher costs and more uncertainty, which 
can decrease socio-emotional wealth [28]. 
Moreover, mixed diversifi cation strategies 
require the use of new resources and skills 
which may not own family fi rm [28].
However, family fi rms with greater 
concentration of ownership prefer mixed 
diversifi cation strategies more than family 
businesses with less concentration of ownership 
(confi rming H6). Family fi rms with signifi cant 
concentration of ownership may prefer mixed 
diversifi cation, as it reduces the risks supported 
by the family [45] by reducing income and 
result volatility [21]. Moreover, the higher family 
ownership the higher probability of occurrence 
of agency problem type II (majority shareholder 
vs. minority shareholder).
The models explain specialization and 
mixed diversifi cation very well, although not 
unrelated diversifi cation strategies, presumably 
due to the very small number of fi rms controlled 
by foreign capital (6) or banks (11) that choose 
this strategy.
Conclusion
This study aims to characterise and analyse the 
impact of ownership structure on specialization 
and diversifi cation strategies (distinguishing 
between related, unrelated and mixed 
diversifi cation), according to both concentration 
of ownership and type of controlling shareholder. 
The study is not only original because it studies 
diversifi cation in relation to ownership structure, 
but because it also analyses diversifi cation 
using corporate groups rather than parent 
companies. After selecting a representative 
sample of the leading companies trading on 
the Spanish stock exchange, we tested our 
hypotheses using binomial logistic regression 
and different statistical tests. Family fi rms 
represent more than half the fi rms in the sample, 
followed in order of importance by fi rms where 
no single shareholder has effective control 
(less than 25% in 2005), fi rms under fi nancial 
control (around 12% of the sample) and fi rms 
controlled by foreign capital (less than 10%).
The results show the importance of the 
ownership structure on diversifi cation strategy 
adopted by the business group [15], [19], [30], 
[31], [63], [76], [16]. We test how ownership 
concentration and family control have a positive 
impact on the decision to specialize. The higher 
ownership concentration decrease agency 
cost, due to alignment between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders 
interest. Higher ownership concentration 
solves agency problem type I, that is, reduces 
discretionary power of managers and decrease 
diversifi cation (increase specialization) [30], 
[34], [68]. Also family fi rms adopt specialization 
strategies due to diversifi cation can damage 
socio-emotional wealth [29] or family fi rm does 
not have the resources needed to carry out new 
activities [10]. However, greater family control 
(higher ownership concentration) decrease 
specialization. This may be due to appearance 
of tunneling, where family shareholders are 
seeking greater profi ts and benefi ts even if 
it is at the expense of the wealth of minority 
shareholders (agency problem type II) [15], 
[39], [74].
When considering the type of diversifi cation 
strategy, we found that ownership 
concentration presents a negative impact 
on mixed diversifi cation. Lower ownership 
concentration increase manager discretionality, 
so managers will use mixed diversifi cation 
strategies to decrease personal risk and 
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obtain higher income and greater prestige [68]. 
Higher ownership concentration will decrease 
manager discretionality and therefore mixed 
diversifi cation strategies will be less used. 
Family fi rms use more related diversifi cation 
strategies and less mixed diversifi cation than 
non-family fi rms. Family fi rms try to ensure fi rm 
survival and select those strategies that maintain 
socio-emotional wealth and/or allow value 
creation [28], [55]. This causes a preference 
for related diversifi cation, which generally has 
a positive impact on performance [61] with 
respect mixed and unrelated diversifi cation. 
Unrelated and mixed diversifi cation strategies 
require more resources and involve higher 
agency and information costs [73], which have 
a negative impact on performance. However, 
greater family control favors the use of mixed 
strategies that may be due to decrease family 
risk [42] or the appearance an agency problem 
type II and tunneling practices.
Also, fi rms not controlled by a single 
shareholder (SCD) present the greatest levels 
of diversifi cation, particularly unrelated, and 
minimally choose specialization. These fi rms are 
characterized by higher manager discretionality 
(agency problem type I), therefore managers 
will adopt diversifi cation strategies that will 
reduce managers personal risk and increase 
their power [1] These organizations have the 
lowest levels of concentration of ownership. 
Finally, fi rms controlled by banks and/or 
foreign capital present intermediate values 
in the control variables and diversifi cation 
strategies. Concluding, the higher differences 
in diversifi cation strategies are established 
between family fi rms (higher ownership 
concentration) and fi rms no controlled by 
a single shareholder (lower ownership 
concentration). In family fi rms, when ownership 
concentration is high, it may appear an agency 
problem type II [70].
The study is a fi rst approach to the 
relationship between ownership structure, 
family nature and diversifi cation. The 
diversifi cation variables are dummies and it 
would be interesting to use other alternative 
measures such as entropy [60], more 
appropriately weighting degree of total, related 
and unrelated diversifi cation. This would also 
use more statistically advanced and precise 
methods that would be able to confi rm the 
results obtained here. The models also show 
the importance of analysing the last owner of 
non-family fi rms, as it can affect the signifi cance 
of the results obtained (in this paper, it reaffi rms 
the consistency of the models and results).
Future research should study the 
relationship between performance and 
productivity according to ownership structure 
and type of diversifi cation, according to the last 
owner. There are very few studies [29], [41] 
and further research is required. Likewise, the 
development of a special type of diversifi cation, 
vertical integration (performance of related 
value chain activities, before or after each 
other) could be considered; it has hardly 
been considered in the literature [41], [66] or 
it has been considered as a type of related 
diversifi cation, a legal development with an 
impact on ownership structure and degree of 
diversifi cation. 
This paper is part of the results obtained in 
the framework of the research project Eco2009-
13158 fi nanced by Ministerio de Ciencia e 
Innovación and the CREVALOR Group of 
Research, acknowledged and fi nanced by 
DGA-FSE.
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Abstract
DOES CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP AND FAMILY CONTROL AFFECT 
SPECIALISATION/DIVERSIFICATION BUSINESS STRATEGIES?
Alejandro Hernández-Trasobares, Carmen Galve-Górriz
The impact of family ownership on strategic decision-making and diversifi cation in public 
corporations is an important but not clearly understood aspect of modern corporate governance. 
In many cases, large-block family owners of public corporations may have a great deal of input 
in strategic decision-making in large corporations. Previous literature investigates how ownership 
structure and diversifi cation are connected, but  conclusions are not homogeneous. Agency theory 
suggests that professional managers are fundamentally self-interested, and the public corporation 
diversifi es because managers pursue their own interests, rather than the interest of shareholders. 
However in family fi rms, ownership and control use to coincide and family diversifi cation decisions 
which causes a lower diversifi cation. In this paper authors analyzes the impact of ownership 
concentration and the infl uence of ultimate owner’s nature of business group (family or non-family) 
in diversifi cation’s decision: specialization, related diversifi cation, unrelated diversifi cation and 
mixed diversifi cation (when a company uses both related and unrelated diversifi cation) Based on 
a sample of ninety-nine Spanish listed companies during the years 2000–2005, and using the listed 
company an their subsidiaries (pyramidal group) as unit of analysis, this research fi nds: fi rstly, the 
highest ownership concentration increases the adoption of specialization strategies and reduce 
the mixed diversifi cation; Secondly, attending to ultimate owner’s nature, family fi rms adopt more 
strategies of specialization and related diversifi cation, and less diversifi cation strategies than non-
family fi rms; Finally, results also show behaviour differences in family fi rms according to ownership 
concentration’s degree: an increasing ownership concentration’s degree in family fi rms rises the 
probability of diversifi cation.
Key Words: Family fi rm, specialization, diversifi cation, ultimate owner, corporate governance.
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